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Abstract
Health economists and policymakers have long recognized that
capitation gives insurers incentive to manipulate their oﬀerings
to deter the sick and attract the healthy. The shadow-price ap-
proach to measuring such selection incentives was pioneered by
Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000). We extend their model to
allow for partial capitation and non￿nancial concerns of insurers.
We calculate three kinds of selection metrics using managed care
medical and pharmacy spending data for ￿scal years 2001 and
2002 from the Massachusetts state employee insurance program.
Financial returns to risk selection are high, as indicated by all
three selection indices as well as by the direct pro￿ts an insurer
c o u l de a r ni fi tc o u l de x c l u d eu n p r o ￿table patients. Empirically,
the ￿nancial temptation to distort service quality increases non-
linearly with supply-side cost sharing. The more an insurer di-
rectly values quality or patient bene￿tr e l a t i v et op r o ￿t, the less
severe risk selection incentives become.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Health economists and policymakers have long recognized that capi-
tation payment￿or any payment featuring ￿supply-side cost sharing￿
(Ellis and McGuire 1990)￿gives health plans and providers incentive
to manipulate their oﬀerings to deter the sick and attract the healthy.
This behavior is variously known as ￿risk selection,￿ ￿plan manipula-
tion,￿ ￿cream skimming,￿ or ￿cherry picking￿ (Newhouse 1996; Cutler
and Zeckhauser 1998 and 2000).1 When health plans compete to avoid
the sick rather than provide quality care, the most vulnerable patients
may experience access problems. More generally, selection prevents in-
dividuals from being able to buy insurance against becoming a bad risk
in the future (Newhouse 1996; Feldman and Dowd 2000). Selection thus
c a nb ec o n s i d e r e db o t ha ne ﬃciency and an equity problem.
To deter selection, employers and other purchasers frequently enforce
open enrollment periods, proscribe pre-existing conditions clauses, and
stipulate standard bene￿t packages. Yet health plans may engage in
many subtle forms of risk selection. Examples include selective market-
ing, location of health facilities in pro￿table areas (see, e.g., Norton and
Staiger 1994), staﬃng and infrastructure decisions, and distortion of the
quality of speci￿c services. We focus on the latter problem of service-
speci￿c quality distortions, pioneered by Frank, Glazer and McGuire
(2000) and applied by Glazer and McGuire (2001, 2002a, 2002b), Cao
and McGuire (2003) and Ellis and McGuire (2004).
In this paper, we use three diﬀerent metrics of selection incentives
to estimate empirically how a pro￿t-maximizing insurer would want to
distort service oﬀerings to attract pro￿table enrollees. One method,
proposed by Ellis and McGuire (2004), combines information about how
predictable use of a service is, with whether prior spending on that
service predicts future high costs (and thus greater insurance costs). The
second method is the ￿shadow price￿ approach to managed care (Frank,
Glazer and McGuire 2000; hereafter FGM), discussed momentarily. We
propose a complementary third method which estimates the marginal
net bene￿t to the insurer of deviating from a socially optimal level of
care.
All three measures quantify the ￿nancial temptation to engage in risk
selection; none measure the extent to which selection is actually taking
place.2 Research quantifying the extent to which insurers and providers
1Newhouse (1996) de￿nes selection as ￿actions of economic agents on either side of
the market to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and break pooling arrangements,
with the result that some consumers may not obtain the insurance they desire￿
(p.1236).
2To emphasize this distinction, we include ￿incentives￿ in the title (￿Measuring
2respond to these ￿nancial incentives is an important complementary
undertaking.
A health plan can discourage unpro￿table customers from enrolling
by stringently rationing the services valued by those customers. In the
shadow-price approach to managed care, rationing is captured by the
shadow price associated with each service.3 By allocating a small bud-
get to a given service or using other strategies (e.g., utilization review,
￿nancial incentives to providers, staﬃng limitations or other methods
of making expensive services inconvenient), a health plan manager can
increase the shadow price of access to that service. For example, a
health plan may ￿nd it ￿nancially rewarding to limit access to mental
health services (i.e., impose a high shadow price) but encourage access to
preventive care (oﬀer a low shadow price). Non-price mechanisms may
include waiting time, geographic accessibility, and other dimensions of
convenience. Which services are distorted depends on which consumers
are unpro￿table, determined by such factors as the level of the payment
and the correlation of predicted spending between services.
In the original empirical application of the shadow-price approach,
FGM demonstrate how pro￿t-maximizing shadow prices can be esti-
mated from individual-level health expenditure data, using Michigan
Medicaid fee-for-service claims data for about 16,000 individuals span-
ning three years (1991-1993).
We extend FGM￿s theoretical model to allow for (a) non￿nancial
concerns of providers (such as professional ethics and personal values);
and (b) various forms of mixed or blended payments (partial capita-
tion). Then we apply the method to more recent data for a larger and
more representative employed population enrolled in managed care and
indemnity plans. Our data include claims and managed care encounter
data on both medical and pharmacy spending for ￿scal years 2001 and
2002 (July 1, 2000 - June 31, 2002) from the Group Insurance Commis-
sion (GIC) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts￿one of the largest
selection incentives in managed care:...￿), by contrast with FGM, ￿Measuring adverse
selection in managed care.￿
3The shadow price approach is entirely consistent with diﬀerent intensity of service
across patients.
Ma (2004) shows that an enrollee-group shadow price, rather than a service-speci￿c
shadow price, serves to maximize pro￿ts when allocating plan resources across ser-
vices and enrollees. Although we acknowledge that this will be an interesting ap-
proach to explore empirically, we focus instead on service-speci￿c shadow prices be-
cause they seem more consistent with empirical evidence on how providers serve
heterogenous patients. For example, Glied and Zivin (2002) ￿nd visit duration to be
constant across patients within a practice, and ￿physicians who treat mostly HMO
patients appear to adopt a practice style that oﬀers equivalent treatment intensity
along most measurable dimensions￿ (p.353).
3health care purchasers in New England. The selection indices we calcu-
late thus represent the ￿rst application of these metrics to managed care
data.
We ￿nd consistent results with all three measures of selection incen-
tives: insurers have incentive to ￿dump￿ enrollees with expensive heart
conditions, diabetes or mental health and substance abuse problems (and
to ￿cream￿ enrollees with skin problems or conditions of the eyes, ears,
n o s ea n dt h r o a t ) .G i v e np r e v i o u se v i d e n c eo fr i s ks e g m e n t a t i o ni nt h i s
population despite the GIC￿s many creative purchasing initiatives (Cut-
ler and Zeckhauser 1998; Yu, Ellis and Ash 2001; Altman, Cutler, and
Zeckhauser 2003), not surprisingly we ￿nd that risk adjustment con-
siderably mitigates these selection incentives. The GIC￿s recent move
towards all-encounter health-based risk adjustment among its plans is
thus well warranted.
Economic theory suggests that mixed or blended payment ￿ partial
capitation ￿ can be eﬀective in combating risk selection (e.g., Ellis and
McGuire 1990; Ma 1994; Newhouse 1996; Ma and McGuire 1997; Pauly
2000; Eggleston 2000; Newhouse 2002). Yet empirical evidence is lim-
ited regarding the eﬀectiveness of mixed payment in reducing selection
i n c e n t i v e s . A sf a ra sw ek n o w ,o u r si st h e￿rst empirical estimate of
returns to risk selection over a full range of supply-side cost sharing.
The results suggest a nonlinear relationship. Doubling the fraction of
costs borne by plans or providers more than doubles the rewards to risk
selection.
We also show theoretically and empirically that the more the plan
directly cares about quality or patient bene￿tr e l a t i v et op r o ￿t, the less
severe risk selection incentives become. Plan or provider ￿benevolence￿
(Chalkley and Malcomson 1998) can thus help to explain a somewhat
perplexing ￿nding in FGM. When patients know as much about their
expected health spending as they are often assumed to know (e.g., what
they spent last year), the plan￿s pro￿t-maximizing shadow prices for
FGM￿s sample went ￿oﬀ the charts￿ (FGM, p.851). Hence FGM cal-
culate shadow prices assuming patients predict future use of services
based on only 40% of prior use. A simple alternative explanation for
why shadow prices would not actually go ￿oﬀ the charts￿ is provider
benevolence or adherence to professional norms. Even when patients
can predict their future spending needs quite accurately and an uncon-
strained pro￿t-maximizing plan would have incentive for extreme quality
distortions, the plan may be constrained from implementing such qual-
ity distortions by provider benevolence or the plan￿s own concern for
reputation.
Finally, we supplement the analysis with a more conventional mea-
4sure of selection incentives: the direct pro￿ts that an insurer could
achieve by excluding unpro￿table enrollees (see Shen and Ellis 2002).
For the GIC managed care population, a risk-selecting health plan that
successfully excludes unpro￿table patients could increase pro￿ts, achiev-
i n gap r o ￿t rate ranging from 14% to over 50%. Pro￿ts are generally
higher, the more the plan knows relative to the payer. These results
further underscore the strong ￿nancial temptation for insurers to invest
in risk identi￿cation and selection.
The paper is organized as follows. We preface the empirical analysis
with a discussion of the three selection indices, extending the theory of
shadow prices to integrate non-pecuniary objectives and supply-side cost
sharing. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4
presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes by summarizing our
￿ndings and suggesting the potential usefulness of the selection metrics
for employers and other purchasers.
2 Theory of Shadow Prices and Managed Care
A health plan provides various health care services (e.g., prenatal care,
treatment of heart attack patients, mental health services) indexed by j.
Let mi
j represent the spending on health service j provided to individ-






represent the increasing and concave ex ante utility
individual i derives from that spending. Total service-related utility








. Following FGM, we also
assume consumer valuation of a health plan includes some individual-
speci￿cf a c t o r￿i such as convenience and premium diﬀerences. These
individual-speci￿c factors are distributed in the population according to
the cumulative distribution Φi (￿i).
When choosing a health plan, each individual computes the expected
utility from each plan available and chooses the plan that oﬀers the high-
est utility. Given the spending levels in each plan, consumer i prefers a
given health plan if and only if vi (mi)+￿i > ui,w h e r eui is the con-
sumer￿s valuation of the next-preferred health plan. Plans must accept
all applicants during an ￿open enrollment period￿ enforced by the pur-
chaser. The plan does not know each individual￿s ￿i, but it does know
the cumulative distribution from which it is drawn. The plan considers

























50. Aware of this demand response to spending generosity, a pro￿t-
maximizing managed care plan can try to attract pro￿table patients
with generous spending on services those enrollees value most, while
simultaneously stinting on services disproportionately used by unprof-
itable patients.4
We follow the FGM model of managed care in using a shadow price
approach, ￿rst used by Keeler, Carter and Newhouse (1998) and more
recently applied in Glazer and McGuire (2002a, 2002b). The health plan
sets a shadow price qj for access to health service j such that ￿the patient
must ￿need￿ or bene￿t from services above a certain threshold in order






A high shadow price represents stringent rationing. In the extreme (a
shadow price approaching ￿in￿nity￿), that service is simply not oﬀered
or covered at all. By contrast, a very low shadow price means little or
no limitation on patient use of that service, i.e., full indulgence of moral
hazard by insured consumers.
We can either think of the plan choosing the vector of service-speci￿c
shadow prices, q, directly, or that this is re￿ective of a more general
framework in which there is a ￿division of responsibility between the
￿management￿...and ￿clinicians￿￿: ￿cost-conscious management allocates
a budget or a physical capacity for a service. Clinicians working in the
service area do the best they can for patients given the budget by ra-
tioning care so that care goes to the patients that bene￿t most￿ (FGM,
p.836). See Eggleston and Yip (2004) for an explicit model of plan-
physician contracting and physician choice of spending levels for each
patient.
Health plans will respond to ￿nancial incentives when choosing shadow
prices for various health services. Payment may be more generous for
some services or patients than others. These ￿nancial incentives will
shape the plan￿s desire to promote quality for speci￿c services.
Assume payment includes two components. First, for each enrollee,
the plan receives a ￿xed pre-payment (capitation) ri. If capitation pay-
ments are risk adjusted, ri will diﬀer according to the risk adjusters
(such as age, sex, and diagnoses of individual i)i n c l u d e di nt h er i s k
adjustment formula. Risk adjustment can be a powerful tool to combat
selection. Unfortunately, however, risk adjusters remain imperfect and
4We focus on the incentives facing a single representative health plan; analyz-
ing market equilibria (when plans may face a prisoners￿ dilemma) is left to future
research.
6little used (see discussion in van de Ven and Ellis 2000 and Newhouse
2002). Our model focuses on the selection incentives remaining under
any system with imperfect risk adjustment.
In addition to prepayment r, the plan receives reimbursement (1 − sj)mi
j
for each service j ,w i t hsj ≤ 1. Employers that contract for a fully in-
sured product with no additional reimbursements, as for many HMOs,
have sj = 0 for all services. The health plan is at risk at point of service
for the proportion of spending sjmi
j,a n dsj > 0 denotes supply-side cost
sharing (i.e., mixed payment). In practice, supply-side cost sharing does
not often vary signi￿cantly across services (except sometimes for mental
health and substance abuse in managed behavioral health carve-outs;
see Frank and McGuire 2000). Usually the prepayment amount varies
according to the degree of supply-side cost sharing, for example r(s)
with dr
ds > 0a n dr(s ≤ 0) = 0. Throughout our analysis we will assume
that prepayment r is set to satisfy the plan￿s participation constraint,
so that the plan wishes to attract positive enrollments from the payer,5
and that r(s) is set so that supply-side cost sharing is ￿budget neutral,￿
i.e., the plan￿s expected pro￿t is the same across all levels of supply-side
cost sharing (Eπ = r(s) − sm = constant).
This payment formulation can capture a wide range of linear plan
reimbursement schemes. A fully capitated plan would receive a positive
ri per enrollee and be fully liable for costs of care, i.e., sj =1f o re v e r y
service j. A mixed payment system features 0 <s<1. For example,
McClellan (1997) ￿nds that the cost-sharing features of the US Prospec-
tive Payment System correspond to s ≈ 0.5. Pure cost reimbursement
corresponds to r =0a n ds = 0. Fee-for-service payment with a positive
pro￿tm a r g i na r i s e sw h e ns<0. For example, s = −0.05 would mean
t h ep l a ni sr e i m b u r s e d( 1− [−0.05])mi
j =1 .05mi
j,t h a ti s ,r e c e i v e sa5 %
pro￿tm a r g i na b o v ec o s tmi
j.6
Given demand ni (q) and payment ri+
P
j (1 − sj)mi
j (q) per enrollee,
5See Glazer and McGuire (2002b, Proposition 3) for a shadow-price model focusing
on incentives for quality when plans and providers contract with multiple payers, in
which a public payer such as Medicare must explicitly satisfy an plan participation
constraint.
6Fee-for-service margins often diﬀer by service, so that service-speci￿cc o s ts h a r i n g
and service-speci￿c shadow prices extend readily to analysis of a detailed fee schedule
with diﬀering service-speci￿cp r o ￿t margins (see Eggleston and Yip 2004).



































Assume π (q) is strictly concave. De￿ne πi (q) as the plan￿s gain or
loss for individual i, πi (q)=ri−
P
j sjmi
j (q). Unpro￿table enrollees are
those for which πi (q) < 0. Which enrollees are unpro￿table will depend
on several factors, including the level of the (possibly risk adjusted)
payment, the enrollee￿s pattern of service utilization, and the degree of
supply-side cost sharing on the services used by the enrollee.
We extend FGM￿s theory by incorporating benevolence or profes-
sional ethics into the health plan￿s objective function. A health plan
may have goals beyond, or that moderate, pro￿t maximization. Some
health plans are nonpro￿t, with an explicit commitment to a mission
other than maximizing returns for stockholders. Even ostensibly pro￿t-
maximizing plans may wish to establish a reputation for high quality
and no discrimination against vulnerable patients. Clinicians may care
directly about the patients they serve, and only agree to contract with
plans that do not constrain their clinical decisionmaking too stringently,
thus indirectly constraining plan behavior.
Let the plan￿s degree of ￿delity to patient interests be denoted by α.
The health plan then maximizes an objective function that includes not




































FGM analyze the case of a pure pro￿t maximizer (α =0)p a i do na
capitation basis (s =1 ) ,i nw h i c hc a s eV reduces to π (q(s = 1)).


















































This ￿rst order condition describes the trade-oﬀ a plan makes in
setting the shadow price for each service. The plan￿s marginal bene￿t




Consider a pure pro￿t-maximizing plan, α = 0. The plan￿s marginal cost
of raising qj is discouraging pro￿table patients from joining the plan
(−dni
dqjπi > 0i fπi > 0). The higher the pro￿t margin per enrollee, the
less attractive risk selection becomes. As FGM note, ￿the idea behind
competition among managed care plans is that ... the plan by rationing
too tightly will lose pro￿table customers ￿ to balance the plan￿s incentive
to reduce services to the existing enrollees￿ (p.838). Agency on behalf of
patients discourages stinting by adding additional terms to the marginal
cost of raising qj: −α
n
dni




If the payment system does not include any supply-side cost sharing
(s ≤ 0), the left-hand side of (5) is zero or negative, and plans will
not want to restrict access to services. This is consistent with a low
threshold for use, and wasteful over-use, under cost reimbursement or
fee-for-service (q∗
j =0 ) .
The condition (5) thus de￿nes the pro￿t-maximizing shadow price as
the shadow price that balances the marginal bene￿t and marginal cost of
increasing qj, or, equivalently, causes the net marginal bene￿to fr a i s i n g





























Marginal Cost to Plan
=0 ( 6 )
Clearly, the pro￿t- or utility-maximizing shadow price can exceed or
fall short of the socially optimal value, q∗∗ = 1, which equates patient
marginal treatment bene￿t with social marginal cost for each service:
q
∗∗ =a r gm a x[ v (m(q)) − m(q)] = 1 (7)
The bene￿ts of some degree of supply-side cost sharing are well es-
tablished in the theoretical literature (Ellis and McGuire 1990; Ma 1994;
Newhouse 1996; Ma and McGuire 1997; Eggleston 2000; van Barneveld,
Lamers, van Vliet, and van de Ven 2001). The argument for some
supply-side cost sharing holds for both pro￿t-maximizing and altruistic
9plans and providers. Indeed, genuine concern for patient welfare rein-
forces the argument, because providers that act as good agents for fully
insured consumers will indulge patient moral hazard, contributing to
overspending under cost reimbursement. Supply-side cost sharing helps
to control over-spending, but gives plans incentive to control spending
diﬀerentially by service. Stinting disproportionately on the services at-
tractive to expensive consumers discourages their enrollment and hence
achieves risk selection. Similarly, overspending on services valuable to
pro￿table consumers (such as discounts on health club membership or
yoga classes) lures them to enroll. Call such selection-motivated dispar-
ities in spending or shadow prices ￿quality-distortion selection.￿ Higher
supply-side cost sharing induces more quality-distortion selection.
Diﬀerent degrees of supply-side cost sharing for diﬀerent services
might improve incentives relative to uniform payment. However, varying
supply-side cost sharing by service may be too administratively cumber-
some to be practical, even if analysts could pinpoint optimal service-
speci￿c cost sharing. Nevertheless, employers and other purchasers can
use information about ￿vulnerable services￿ in applying a whole gamut
of purchasing strategies, including quality monitoring. A purchaser that
discovers hypertension treatment and behavioral health services to be
extremely vulnerable to selection-motivated quality distortions, for ex-
ample, could target quality monitoring time and eﬀort on those partic-
ular services. Perhaps a payment adjustment, such as a carve-out for
behavioral health, would be suitable; but clearly this will not be practical
for all ￿high risk￿ services. Instead, the purchaser can use quality moni-
toring and payment re￿nement as complementary purchasing strategies.
2.1 Empirically Estimating Selection Incentives
Ellis and McGuire (2004) propose a selection index based on the ￿rst-
order condition (6). They focus on two elements of predicted pro￿tability
of oﬀering a service: how predictable use of the service is, and how
predictive spending is of overall costs. Insurers have incentive to ration
services that are predictable and associated with high total cost. Let
b mi
j denote consumer i￿s predicted spending on service j.T h e i rp r o p o s e d
selection index for service j is the product of two terms: the coeﬃcient of
variation in predicted service spending b mj (i.e., the standard deviation of
b mj divided by its mean), multiplied by the contemporaneous Pearson￿s
correlation between b mj and total actual spending.
For the second, shadow-price approach to measuring selection incen-
tives, FGM show that for the special case of a pure pro￿t maximizer








Generalizing to include supply-side cost sharing and nonpecuniary
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A straightforward extension of the FGM generalization to uncer-
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In (11), b mj is the average of all consumers￿ predicted spending on
service j; r is the average capitation payment, where the capitation
payment is adjusted upward from that predicted by the given risk ad-
justment method so that all patients are pro￿table (following FGM,
ri =1 .5ri
HCC); b σj is the standard deviation of consumers￿ expected
spending on service j; b σr is the standard deviation of risk-adjusted cap-
itation payments; b ρj,j0 is the correlation coeﬃcient between predicted
11spending on service j and predicted spending on service j0; b ρrj is the
correlation coeﬃcient between risk-adjusted capitation payments and
predicted spending on service j0; s is the weighted average degree of
supply-side cost sharing, weighted by average predicted spending for
each service j;a n dc M is the average total predicted spending for con-
sumers, i.e., the capitation payment that would make the plan just break
even if every enrollee had average predicted spending.
Predicted spending b mj depends on how much information individuals
have and use when choosing health plans. FGM compare predicted
spending under two information assumptions: based only on age and
sex, and based on age and sex plus some of the information embodied
in prior use of health services (40%). We estimate predicted spending
for these information assumptions plus all of the information in prior
use (100% prior use; see Table 2). We follow FGM in reporting shadow
prices relative to the shadow price for ￿all other services.￿
We propose a third measure of selection incentives. For some policy
and analytic questions, it can also be useful to think of the empirical
formula for service-speci￿c shadow prices (11) as allowing empirical es-
timation of the net marginal bene￿t of risk selection. As noted above
in (6), pro￿t-maximizing shadow prices are those that set the marginal
bene￿t of raising shadow prices equal to the marginal cost of doing so
(i.e., losing some pro￿table enrollees). Suppose instead that plans had
to set shadow prices at the socially optimal value of 1. When qj =1 ,
the marginal bene￿t of risk selection would outweigh its marginal cost,
at least for some services j. One can estimate the marginal bene￿to f
risk selection less its marginal cost, or the net marginal bene￿to fr i s k

























This captures the ￿nancial temptation or reward to health plans for
deviating from socially-optimal quality for speci￿c services. The plan
has ￿nancial incentive to risk select when the net marginal bene￿to f
doing so is positive. When the cost of service distortions￿in terms of
12forgone enrollment (or damaged reputation)￿outweighs the bene￿t, the
net marginal bene￿t is negative, and the plan will no longer have an
incentive to risk select. Hence the total net marginal bene￿to fr i s ks e -
lection aggregates across only those services for which the net marginal
bene￿t of selection is positive. We de￿ne NetMB as the weighted aver-
age of the incentive to risk select for speci￿c services, where the weights
are the share of predicted spending on each service (
b mj
M ).
We use this measure to examine empirically how selection incentives
diﬀer across diﬀerent degrees of supply-side cost sharing￿with s ranging
between 0 (cost reimbursement) and 1 (fully prospective payment or
capitation).7 We assume that the plan￿s expected pro￿t is constant re-
gardless of the degree of supply-side cost sharing. Speci￿cally, expected
net revenue per patient is equal to half the average capitation payment:
Eπ = r(s) − sc M,=0 .5c M,s ot h a tr(s)=( 0 .5+s) c M.8
Empirically estimating the net marginal bene￿t of selection also al-
lows policymakers to quantify how much provider altruism, or caring
for patients, helps to mitigate selection. Agency on behalf of patients
increases the value of the shadow price denominator by a positive term,
hence decreasing the shadow price. (In the limit, a provider who is a
￿super-agent￿ for his or her patients will not wish to restrict access to
any services, and the resulting shadow prices will all be 0.) We proxy
a patient￿s value for the plan, vi, with average total predicted spend-
ing, c M, as arguably a plausible lower bound. The additional agency
term in the denominator of shadow price qj c a nt h e nb ee x p r e s s e da s
αb mj
‡
c M + n
·
≈ αb mjc M. We calculate shadow prices and the net bene-
￿t of selection for various degrees of provider benevolence by adding the
term αb mjc M to the denominator of (11) or to the marginal cost term of
(12).
3D a t a a n d E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
The shadow price approach has been developed to be applied to man-
aged care, yet it has not yet been so applied; we do so. Our data
7We use this measure because the shadow prices themselves do not well capture
the change in incentives as s or α change from 0 to 1 (or greater for α). This
is because the ￿raw￿ shadow prices (i.e., not in ratios to ￿other services￿) ￿switch
o v e r ￿t on e g a t i v ev a l u e sa td i ﬀering rates as s decreases and/or α increases, causing
the ratio of shadow prices to ￿uctuate seemingly wildly. The net marginal bene￿t
of selection metric avoids this problem by using the diﬀerence, rather than the ratio,
of the empirically estimated marginal bene￿t and marginal cost of selection. It is
an intermediate metric between shadow prices and the Ellis and McGuire (2004)
selection index.
8In the case of risk adjustment, both the average capitation payment and its
standard deviation vary with s.
13include claims and managed care encounter data￿diagnoses and both
medical and pharmacy spending￿from the Group Insurance Commis-
sion (GIC) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, one of the largest
health care purchasers in New England. The GIC oﬀers bene￿ciaries
a choice of an indemnity plan, a Preferred Provider Organization, and
several Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). We focus on those
enrolled in HMOs, but also compare results to those for enrollees in the
indemnity plan.9 For more detail on the GIC and previous evidence
of risk selection among their plans, see Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998),
Altman, Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998, 2003), and Yu, Ellis and Ash
(2001).
We linked eligibility and medical claims for two ￿scal years, from
July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2002. The GIC holds open enrollment in June
of each year. The data thus cover two years of enrollment. Throughout
the analysis, ￿year 1￿ refers to ￿scal year 2001 (July 2000 - June 2001),
and ￿year 2￿ refers to ￿scal year 2002 (July 2001 - June 2002).
The data extract that we obtained through Medstat, which manages
the data for the GIC, includes a variable coded as managed care, indem-
nity or PPO. For the ￿HMO enrollees￿ sub-sample (65,615 enrollees),
we included all continuously enrolled,10 non-elderly adults (age 18-64)
who were coded as being in a managed care plan in both years. Thus,
we pool the encounter data across all the HMOs oﬀered by the GIC. We
also look separately as the sub-sample of non-elderly adults continuously
enrolled in the indemnity plan (86,365).11
The spending variable represents total covered charges, including pa-
tient out-of-pocket payments.12 We examined selection incentives with
9The shadow prices estimated from the GIC HMO encounter data reveal the selec-
tion incentives that the HMOs face. Shadow prices for the enrollees in the indemnity
plan (which the GIC self-insures), in contrast, predict selection incentives for the
hypothetical yet policy-relevant case of switching those enrollees into managed care.
These characterize incentives that would appear if the GIC removed the non-managed
care plan options for those bene￿ciaries (e.g., forced them into HMOs). They also
give information about how current managed care plans may try to discourage those
currently in the indemnity plan from switching into an HMO. The indemnity plan
shadow prices are most relevant for comparing results with those of FGM, who used
non-managed-care data.
10Eligibility information was coded as a dummy variable for each quarter. We
counted as continuously enrolled anyone who was eligible for all eight quarters of the
data.
11By including enrollees only under age 65, we avoid the complications of including
the 41% of indemnity-plan enrollees who are on Medicare. Only 412 indemnity plan
enrollees (about 1%) are under age 65 and enrolled in Medicare. All GIC bene￿ciaries
who are on Medicare enroll in the indemnity plan.
12The total charge allowed is the amount of submitted charges eligible for payment
for all claims. It is the amount eligible after applying pricing guidelines, but before
14spending de￿ned to include charges for medical plus pharmacy spending.
Unfortunately the pharmacy data did not include diagnoses that would
allow allocating drug spending to speci￿c service categories. Therefore
we allocated pharmacy spending to service categories in proportion to
medical spending in the same year.
To de￿ne categories of medical services, we followed closely the method-
ology of FGM: a mixture of chronic and acute conditions, with a sizeable
percentage of enrollees (no fewer than 10%) using each service in each
year. The categories replicate the strategy employed by FGM but not
their exact service categories, since not all are as appropriate for our
sample as for their Medicaid sample. (For example, birth services were
a large category for FGM￿s AFDC-eligible Medicaid sample but not for
our sample).
Descriptive statistics on the percentage of enrollees who used each
of our 11 de￿ned services and their costs are shown in Table 1. They
show how the managed care and indemnity plan enrollee populations
diﬀer. Indemnity enrollees have a higher probability of use for almost
every service. Risk assessment using Diagnostic Cost Group estimated
risk score of the population also underscores how much healthier HMO
enrollees are on average. The HMO sample has an average risk score
of 1.303 using all-encounter data; by contrast, indemnity plan enrollees
have an average risk score of 1.915.
Mental health and substance abuse spending is highly predictable
with information on prior use, as revealed by the last column of Table 1,
correlation with own costs last year. However, for both the managed care
and indemnity plan enrollees, spending on mental health and substance
abuse has one of the lowest correlations with all other costs, suggesting
that this service may not be highly predictive of high-cost individuals.
Note that the mental health and substance abuse component of the
indemnity plan is carved out to a managed behavioral health provider;
consistent with this, utilization of this service is similar across the HMO
and indemnity plan enrollees.
deducting third party, copayment, coinsurance, or deductible amounts.
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Table 1a. Patterns of spending, GIC managed care, Estimation sample (N=32,153), Fiscal year 2002 (July 2001 – June 2002) 
 
 
Service  Probability 
of Any Use  
Expected Cost 





Correlation with all 
other costs 
Correlation with 
own costs last year 
Injuries  17.1  846.01  144.51  5.5  0.068  0.280 
Cancer and screening  19.6  1520.02  297.36  11.4  0.104  0.310 
Diabetes  23.6  507.73  119.73  4.6  0.115  0.698 
Digestive conditions  14.3  1296.47  185.72  7.1  0.097  0.330 
Musculoskeletal 
conditions  30.2  894.04  270.00  10.4  0.116  0.283 
Mental Health/ 
Substance Abuse  12.8  1081.71  138.31  5.3  0.031  0.538 
Cardiac care  18.6  1287.61  240.08  9.2  0.132  0.156 
Eye, Ears, Nose, and 
Throat  33.2  437.48  145.14  5.6  0.104  0.336 
Urogenital conditions  22.2  845.25  187.86  7.2  0.071  0.486 
Skin conditions  17.4  355.17  62.00  2.3  0.095  0.238 
Other conditions  74.6  1076.39  802.71  30.8  0.262  0.281 




Service  Probability 
of Any Use  
Expected Cost 





Correlation with all 
other costs 
Correlation with 
own costs last year 
Injuries  18.9  1645.11  310.50  6.0  0.153  0.097 
Cancer and screening  29.3  2420.21  709.15  13.7  0.074  0.359 
Diabetes  34.7  775.21  268.78  5.2  0.086  0.217 
Digestive conditions  19.7  1880.48  371.03  7.1  0.044  0.077 
Musculoskeletal 
conditions  40.4  1660.89  671.61  12.9  0.051  0.323 
Mental Health/ 
Substance Abuse  12.5  1655.00  206.65  4.0  0.037  0.522 
Cardiac care  30.9  2339.50  723.00  13.9  0.152  0.167 
Eye, Ears, Nose, and 
Throat  39.3  689.88  271.29  5.2  0.044  0.252 
Urogenital conditions  27.9  1470.36  410.83  7.9  0.056  0.487 
Skin conditions  24.5  529.09  129.86  2.5  0.080  0.075 
Other conditions  73.2  1504.72  1102.19  21.2  0.192  0.313 
 
 Calculating shadow prices requires estimating individual predicted
expenditures for various information assumptions about how enrollees
choose plans. Potential enrollees may not have full information about
the detailed service oﬀerings of each plan, and they might know their
own precise risk level or how to predict their future use for all services.
Operationally, enrollee informational assumptions correspond to the co-
variates included in the expenditure prediction regression model (e.g.,
age, gender, prior expenditure). ￿We start with the assumption that
individuals can predict based on age and sex. That is, we assume all
individuals predict they will spend the average for a person of their age
and sex for each service category. Alternatively, we assume individuals
can also use the information contained in prior use....In the simulations,
we equip individuals with some of the information in prior use, 40%,
to illustrate the impact of more information￿ (FGM 2000, p.847). For
comparability with FGM￿s results, we report results for 40% as well as
100% prior use.
Since our data include only two years of spending rather than the
three years that FGM use, we employ a split-sample methodology to
calculate predicted spending in the second year. That is, ￿rst we divide
the sample randomly into equal estimation and prediction sub-samples.
Second, we regress year 2 spending on age and sex (represented by six
age-gender ￿cells￿ of ages 18-40, 41-50, and 51-64) and year 1 spending
using the estimation sub-sample. Third, we use the prediction sub-
sample to predict spending in year 2 based the estimated regression co-
eﬃcients and enrollees￿ age, sex and year 1 spending. Predicted spending
for each service uses the full array of 11 services￿ prior use as explana-
tory variables. We estimate spending with two-part models, like FGM.
(Results with ordinary least squares were broadly similar.)
Table 2 shows the correlations between actual and predicted spending
with our diﬀerent information assumptions. As the information used to
predict spending increases, correlations increase, with the largest jump
between age-sex-only and age-sex and some prior use. Mental health
and substance abuse, musculoskeletal conditions and diabetes are the
most predictable with prior use; injuries are among the least predictable
services.
To illustrate the impact of diagnosis-based risk adjustment on selec-
tion, we calculate shadow prices with and without risk adjusting pre-
miums based on the Diagnostic Cost Group / Hierarchical Condition
Category (DCG/HCC) model (Pope, Ellis, Ash, et al. 2000).
18Table 2a. Correlations between actual and predicted spending with different information assumptions 
GIC managed care (HMO enrollees), 2PM predicted spending  
 
 
Model  Service 
  Age, 
Sex 
Age, Sex, 40% 
Prior Use 
Age, Sex, 100% 
Prior Use 
Injuries  0.00  0.18  0.22 
Cancer and 
screening  0.02  0.21  0.22 
Diabetes  0.05  0.44  0.44 
Digestive 
conditions  0.03  0.27  0.28 
Musculoskeletal 
conditions  0.07  0.31  0.32 
Mental Health/ 
Substance Abuse  0.02  0.53  0.53 
Cardiac care  0.10  0.23  0.23 
Eye, Ears, Nose, 
and Throat  0.02  0.27  0.27 
Urogenital 
conditions  0.05  0.31  0.34 
Skin conditions  0.02  0.29  0.30 
Other conditions  0.08  0.20  0.25 
 Table 2b. Correlations between actual and predicted spending with different information assumptions 
GIC indemnity plan enrollees, 2PM predicted spending  
 
 
Model  Service 
  Age, 
Sex 
Age, Sex, 40% 
Prior Use 
Age, Sex, 100% 
Prior Use 
Injuries  0.01  0.12  0.12 
Cancer and 
screening  0.04  0.30  0.31 
Diabetes  0.06  0.27  0.28 
Digestive 
conditions  0.02  0.09  0.09 
Musculoskeletal 
conditions  0.05  0.34  0.34 
Mental Health/ 
Substance Abuse  0.03  0.52  0.52 
Cardiac care  0.08  0.21  0.21 
Eye, Ears, Nose, 
and Throat  0.03  0.31  0.31 
Urogenital 
conditions  0.01  0.24  0.27 
Skin conditions  0.01  0.12  0.12 
Other conditions  0.03  0.18  0.21 
 4 Empirical Results
We ￿nd consistent results using all three measures of selection incentives.
Estimation of the Ellis-McGuire Selection Index (Table 3, Figure 1) re-
veals that the most at-risk services are cardiac, diabetes and cancer care
for the HMO population, and cardiac, mental health/substance abuse,
cancer and diabetes care for the FFS population. The plan has least
incentive to distort services for injuries and conditions of the eyes, ears,
nose and throat. As the descriptive statistics suggested, the coeﬃcient
of variation for mental health and substance abuse is among the highest,
but spending on this service is not highly correlated with total spending,
so the overall selection index is moderate, especially for the HMO pop-
ulation. The average selection index is low when only an enrollee￿s age
and sex are used to predict spending; incentive for selection distortions
increases signi￿cantly when prior use of services is also used to predict
spending.
The empirically estimated shadow prices for GIC managed care and
indemnity plan enrollees are shown in Table 4 for three information as-
sumptions and two risk adjustment systems. The incentive to risk select
decreases with risk adjustment (for any given information assumption)
and increases with the information (i.e., percentage of prior use) that
enrollees use when choosing among plans. Note the greater dispersion
of shadow prices when enrollees have ￿full information￿￿that is, base
health plan choice on all the information embedded in their prior uti-
lization of services.
The service with the highest shadow prices￿indicating that the plan
has ￿nancial incentive to stint￿is cardiac care (for both the managed
care and indemnity plan samples). Other services with shadow prices
greater than 1 include diabetes and mental health and substance abuse.
Figure 2 illustrates the dispersion of shadow prices by service cate-
gory, and how they change with risk adjustment, assuming enrollees
are equipped with the information embodied in 40% prior use. All
the shadow prices tend to move toward the weighted average (gener-
ally closer to 1) when premiums are risk adjusted. For example, risk
adjustment dramatically reduces the shadow price for cardiac care.
The value of risk adjustment in mitigating selection incentives is also
manifest in the last row of Table 4: To estimate shadow prices, the
analyst usually needs to multiply premiums by some factor so that all
services are pro￿table for a plan to supply (i.e., no estimated shadow
prices should be negative). FGM multiplied premiums by 50%. We
￿nd that premiums must be multiplied by up to a factor of 14 (for
the indemnity plan assuming 100% prior use). With risk adjustment,
premiums need only be multiplied by a much smaller multiple in order
21to make all shadow prices positive.
Quality problems can arise from overuse as well as underuse. A
shadow price signi￿cantly below the weighted average indicates that the
plan has ￿nancial incentive to ￿cream￿ enrollees by generously providing
that service. For the HMO enrollee sample, such services include treat-
ment for skin or urogenital conditions. Risk adjustment only partially
￿corrects￿ these creaming incentives.
The new metric proposed here, the net marginal bene￿to fs e l e c t i o n ,
shows the same pattern of incentives to distort services (see Figure 2):
cardiac care shows the highest bene￿t to the plan from rationing; ￿other￿
services are also high; and there is no net marginal bene￿t to rationing
care for injuries. For neither this selection index nor that proposed by
Ellis and McGuire (2004) does the analyst need to multiply premiums
by an arbitrary amount. An additional advantage of the net marginal
bene￿t of selection index is in empirically examining the impact of mixed
payment and provider ￿benevolence,￿ to which we now turn.
22Table 3.  Ellis-McGuire Selection Index, GIC Indemnity and HMO Enrollees 
 
   Indemnity  HMO 
   Predicting spending with enrollee's age and sex only 
Name  CV  corr(m^,M)  Selection Index  CV  corr(m^,M) 
Selection 
Index 
Other conditions  0.614  0.025  0.016  0.645  0.058  0.037 
Cancer and screening  0.613  0.060  0.037  0.649  0.066  0.043 
Diabetes  0.598  0.085  0.051  0.784  0.075  0.059 
Digestive  0.276  0.074  0.020  0.310  0.035  0.011 
Musculoskeletal  0.618  0.057  0.035  0.604  0.053  0.032 
Mental Health/Substance Abuse  0.367  -0.080  -0.029  0.163  -0.089  -0.014 
Cardiac  0.880  0.069  0.061  1.018  0.069  0.071 
Eye, Ears, Nose, Throat  0.302  0.054  0.016  0.162  0.043  0.007 
Urogenital   0.582  0.006  0.003  0.642  0.031  0.020 
Skin  0.180  0.087  0.016  0.128  0.054  0.007 
Injury  0.222  -0.054  -0.012  0.369  -0.069  -0.026 
Average  0.477  0.035  0.019  0.497  0.030  0.022 
   Predicting spending with age, sex, and 40% prior use 
Other conditions  0.858  0.195  0.167  0.696  0.182  0.126 
Cancer and screening  1.948  0.219  0.427  1.718  0.217  0.372 
Diabetes  2.222  0.199  0.442  2.895  0.196  0.568 
Digestive  1.100  0.226  0.248  1.045  0.210  0.219 
Musculoskeletal  1.739  0.196  0.340  1.375  0.200  0.275 
Mental Health/Substance Abuse  4.703  0.123  0.577  3.499  0.098  0.342 
Cardiac  3.507  0.177  0.620  4.410  0.171  0.755 
Eye, Ears, Nose, Throat  1.094  0.168  0.183  0.676  0.168  0.113 
Urogenital   1.147  0.136  0.156  1.169  0.170  0.199 
Skin  1.116  0.163  0.182  0.504  0.253  0.128 
Injury  0.886  0.172  0.152  0.581  0.127  0.074 
Average  1.847  0.179  0.318  1.688  0.181  0.288 
   Predicting spending with age, sex, and 100% prior use 
Other conditions  1.359  0.237  0.321  0.981  0.250  0.245 
Cancer and screening  2.854  0.220  0.627  2.967  0.218  0.647 
Diabetes  2.985  0.196  0.585  3.949  0.194  0.764 
Digestive  2.150  0.222  0.477  2.342  0.210  0.493 
Musculoskeletal  2.575  0.196  0.505  2.350  0.204  0.479 
Mental Health/Substance Abuse  5.255  0.123  0.648  4.442  0.099  0.438 
Cardiac  4.067  0.176  0.715  5.469  0.170  0.929 
Eye, Ears, Nose, Throat  1.856  0.167  0.309  1.422  0.167  0.237 
Urogenital   2.446  0.154  0.377  2.333  0.189  0.440 
Skin  2.142  0.159  0.341  1.415  0.251  0.355 
Injury  1.689  0.181  0.306  1.169  0.181  0.212 
Average  2.671  0.185  0.474  2.622  0.194  0.476 
CV = coefficient of variation of service-specific predicted spending (standard deviation/mean);  
corr(m^,M) = correlation between predicted spending on that service and total spending. Figure 1. Ellis-McGuire Selection Index 

























 Table 4. Shadow prices for three information assumptions and two risk adjustment systems, GIC managed care and 
indemnity plan enrollees 
 
Managed Care (All HMO Enrollees)  Indemnity Plan 
0% prior use  40% prior use  100% prior use  0% prior use  40% prior use  100% prior use 
Services   No  RA   With RA  No  RA   With RA  No  RA   With RA  No  RA   With RA  No  RA   With RA  No  RA   With RA 
Injuries  0.741  1.152  0.886  1.062  0.903  0.700  0.783  1.022  0.923  0.997  0.915  0.554 
Cancer and screening  0.789  0.831  0.982  0.583  1.024  0.403  0.878  0.889  1.048  0.618  1.018  0.333 
Diabetes  0.819  0.781  1.296  0.549  1.407  0.547  0.888  0.839  1.205  0.575  1.177  0.350 
Digestive conditions  0.775  0.957  0.941  0.739  0.989  0.466  0.835  0.920  0.964  0.756  0.963  0.362 
Musculoskeletal conditions  0.803  0.884  0.995  0.741  1.038  0.567  0.880  0.898  1.080  0.861  1.072  0.571 
Mental Health/Substance Abuse  0.740  1.072  1.101  0.615  1.146  0.569  0.756  1.081  1.291  0.957  1.198  0.915 
Cardiac care  0.828  0.745  6.045  0.601  50.455  5.102  0.890  0.804  12.230  0.817  33.245  6.860 
Eye, Ears, Nose, and Throat  0.757  0.966  0.899  0.884  0.908  0.605  0.835  0.939  0.938  0.868  0.898  0.462 
Urogenital conditions  0.755  0.904  0.905  0.725  0.940  0.464  0.823  0.982  0.900  0.808  0.891  0.335 
Skin conditions  0.760  0.969  0.891  0.956  0.900  0.637  0.827  0.933  0.937  0.927  0.912  0.499 
Other conditions  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Weighted average shadow price  0.913  0.961  1.531  0.853  8.884  1.469  0.923  0.943  3.814  0.857  11.420  2.674 
Premium multiplied by X% so 
that all services profitable  50  50  50  250  50  700  50  50  500  50  1400  150 
 
RA = Risk adjustment (using DCG/HCC); shadow prices are relative to “other services”; % prior use is the percentage of prior year 
spending that the enrollees use when predicting current year spending (to assess how a health plan will meet their needs).  
 
 Figure 2. Incentive to Ration Specific Services 
(GIC HMO enrollees, 40% prior use, 2PM)















Shadow price with risk
adjustment
Shadow price with no
risk adjustment
 4.1 Supply-side Cost Sharing and Provider Agency
In addition to risk adjustment, another way to reduce a health plan￿s
incentives to risk select is to used mixed payment (see Newhouse 1996,
2002). Using the GIC managed care encounter data, we empirically
estimate a managed care plan￿s net marginal bene￿to fr i s ks e l e c t i o n
(see (6) and (12) above) for a range of supply-side cost sharing from
capitation (s = 1) through forms of mixed payment (0 <s<1) to pure
cost reimbursement (s = 0). As far as we know, this is the ￿rst empirical
estimate of risk selection incentives over a full range of supply-side cost
sharing.
Figure 3 shows the results, with selection incentives all measured
relative to those under capitation with no risk adjustment. Financial
incentives to distort service quality increase with supply-side cost shar-
ing, reaching their maximum with capitation. Empirically the returns
to selection appear to be convex: reducing supply-side cost sharing from
1 to 0.5 more than halves the incentives to risk select. At s =0 .5￿
representing reimbursement of half of any given dollar￿s expenditure,
similar to PPS (McClellan 1997)￿the weighted average net marginal
bene￿t of selection is about 40% of what it is with full capitation (s =1 ) .
Another way of stating this empirically convex relationship is to say
that introducing partial capitation into what had been a purely cost-
reimbursement payment system can achieve substantial incentive for cost
control without dramatically exacerbating risk selection.
Risk adjustment dramatically reduces selection incentives for any
given level of supply-side cost sharing. Under full supply-side cost shar-
ing (capitation), risk adjustment reduces the marginal net bene￿to f
selection by more than half. With only 50% supply-side cost sharing,
risk adjustment reduces the marginal net bene￿t of selection to only
5% of that under capitation with no risk adjustment. This data clearly
shows the potential power of risk adjustment and mixed payment to
reduce incentives for risk selection.
27 
Figure 3. Selection Incentives Increase with Supply-Side Cost Sharing
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 In addition to, and complementary with, risk adjustment and supply-
side cost sharing, another force that can counteract risk selection is
provider professional ethics or ￿benevolence.￿ To the extent that health
plans and their contracting clinicians directly value quality of care (rel-
ative to pro￿t), they will have less incentive to distort service qualities
to achieve selection. We empirically estimate the impact of benevolence
by calculating the net marginal bene￿t of risk selection for a range of α
(see (4) and the discussion after (12) above).
Figure 4 shows how provider benevolence mitigates risk selection in-
centives. Interestingly, as for supply-side cost sharing, the relationship is
nonlinear. In other words, increasing providers￿ direct concern for qual-
ity more than proportionately reduces incentives to distort service qual-
ity to discourage unpro￿table patients from enrolling. For high enough
provider benevolence, the plan has no incentive to under- or over-provide
any particular services, and wishes instead to provide exactly what the
patient desires, regardless of pro￿tability.
29Figure 4. Selection Incentives Decrease with Provider Agency on Behalf of Patients
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 4.2 Direct Pro￿ts from Risk Selection
Since these three selection metrics are a relatively new, we supplement
the analysis with a more conventional measure: the direct pro￿ts that an
insurer could achieve by excluding unpro￿table enrollees (see Shen and
Ellis 2002). We calculate the maximum obtainable pro￿ts when insur-
ers exclude patients predicted to be unpro￿table based on the previous
year￿s spending and current year￿s premium (or risk adjustment).
The gross pro￿t rates that a risk-selecting health plan can achieve
by excluding unpro￿table patients are shown in Table 5, for various as-
sumptions about what the plan and the payer know about enrollees.
The gross pro￿t rate is total revenue less total cost, as a fraction of total
revenue. Total revenue is the sum of premiums for those who enroll,
i.e., those the plan predicts will be pro￿table given the premiums paid
by the payer and the information that the plan knows about how much
that enrollee will likely spend. Since in reality insurers cannot discrimi-
nate so blatantly or predict individual pro￿tability perfectly, these pro￿t
estimates represent an upper bound on the ￿nancial returns to risk selec-
tion. Panel a shows pro￿ts for a plan serving the managed care enrollee
population, whereas panel b shows the pro￿ts or losses for a plan serving
the indemnity plan population.
Table 5 reveals the strong ￿nancial reward (double-digit pro￿ts) for
a health plan that can ￿gure out how to exclude unpro￿table patients.
Pro￿ts are generally higher, the more the plan knows relative to the
payer. Indeed, if the plan knows enrollee spending in the previous year,
whereas the payer uses at most age and sex to adjust premiums, then the
plan can achieve a pro￿t rate (51-55%) almost as high as if the plan could
perfectly foresee each enrollee￿s actual spending and exclude those that
will be unpro￿table (67-68%). For any given assumption about what the
plan and the payer know about enrollees, gross pro￿tr a t e sd i ﬀer between
the managed care and indemnity plan populations, underscoring the
potency of diagnosis-based risk adjustment for the indemnity population
in particular.




a. Gross profit rates for managed care enrollees, 2PM, (%): 
 
Plan information set  Payer information set 
Age + Sex  HCCs  Prior use  Actual use 
0 (no adjustment)  19.5  41.6  51.2  68.3 
Age + Sex  --  25.9  35.6  -- 
HCCs  13.8  --  35.3  59.4 
 
 
b. Gross profit rates for indemnity plan enrollees, 2PM, (%): 
 
Plan information set  Payer information set 
Age + Sex  HCCs  Prior use  Actual use 
0 (no adjustment)  17.0  40.9  55.2  67.3 
Age + Sex  --  25.1  42.4  -- 
HCCs  -10.4  --  -2.8  42.9 
 
 




 5C o n c l u s i o n
This study extends the theory and empirical study of health insurer selec-
tion incentives. It seems reasonable to assume that risk selection will be
less of an equity and eﬃciency concern when insurers care about things
besides pure pro￿t, or when insurers share the risk of ￿nancial losses
with payers. To test these conjectures theoretically and empirically, we
incorporate insurer non￿nancial concerns and partial supply-side cost
sharing into the empirically implementable shadow price index proposed
by Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000). We also propose a new metric of
selection incentives, the net marginal bene￿t of risk selection (NetMB),
to complement the shadow price estimates. This selection index captures
the ￿nancial reward to insurers for deviating from socially-optimal care.
We compare these results to the selection index developed by Ellis and
McGuire (2004) based on a service￿s predictability and predictiveness.
We calculate all three measures of selection using managed care med-
ical and pharmacy spending data for ￿scal years 2001 and 2002 from the
Massachusetts state employee insurance program. The empirical results
reveal strong ￿nancial returns to risk selection, as indicated both by
the three selection indices and by the direct pro￿ts an insurer could
earn if it could exclude unpro￿table patients. Services most vulnera-
ble to stinting are cardiac care, diabetes care and mental health and
substance abuse services. The net marginal bene￿to fr i s ks e l e c t i o ni n -
creases nonlinearly with supply-side cost sharing, reaching a maximum
with capitation. Thus empirical evidence con￿rms that forms of mixed
payment (such as partial capitation) soften risk selection incentives.
Our empirical estimates also show that adherence to professional
ethics mitigates selection incentives. We simulate this eﬀect by calculat-
ing the net marginal bene￿t of selection as we increase the hypothetical
weight that an insurer puts on patient bene￿t (i.e., quality) relative
to pro￿t. As for supply-side cost sharing, the estimated relationship
is nonlinear: increasing providers￿ direct concern for quality more than
proportionately reduces incentives to distort service quality.
This analysis of managed care encounter data suggests that the Ellis-
McGuire selection index, shadow prices, and the intermediate selection
index proposed herein can be useful for examining insurers￿ ￿nancial
incentives to distort services to attract pro￿table enrollees. As a tool
for measuring selection incentives, these approaches have several ad-
vantages. First, they are more quanti￿able and evidence-based that
two common other approaches to identifying perverse incentives: the
case-by-case or anecdotal approach, and deductive reasoning regarding
all-encompassing categories (e.g., overuse with fee-for-service, underuse
with capitation). Second, analysts can tailor the measurement of selec-
33tion incentives to speci￿c patient populations (e.g., by using the speci￿c
expenditure and diagnosis patterns of that population). Third, employ-
ers and other purchasers can analyze various alternative payment meth-
ods prior to implementation to examine alignment of payment incentives
with quality improvement. This may contribute to better contracting
and clearer targetting of quality assurance programs. Fourth, such anal-
yses can help researchers to identify the weaknesses and strengths of
diﬀerent risk adjustment and risk sharing systems. Fifth, these selec-
tion indices identify potential quality problems without being accusatory
(and could not be used by lawyers as material for discovery).
The methodology for identifying perverse incentives for quality dis-
tortions should be broadly applicable (at least for employers and other
purchasers that have managed care encounter data), even though the
data in this study is not nationally representative. Further research on
these selection indices could help to reveal their relative merits. Fruit-
ful extensions might include examining more detailed service categories
with a larger sample, and simulating additional purchasing strategies to
mitigate selection, such as carve-outs, high-risk pooling, and supply-side
cost sharing that varies across services. Finally, these metrics of se-
lection incentives should be complemented by studies that quantify the
extent of actual selection-motivated quality distortions and how they are
aﬀected by initiatives like mixed payment and pay-for-performance.
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